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THE NETHERLANDS
THE DIFFERENT FLAVOURS OF POPULISM
IN THE NETHERLANDS
Koen Vossen
For a long period of time, the Netherlands made headlines only
because of its royal family, its dikes or its talented soccer‐players.
Within Europe the small, densely populated and affluent nation
seemed to be a haven of stability and tranquillity. However, since
the turn of the century things seem to have changed. The Neth‐
erlands witnessed two political killings (in 2002 political maverick
Pim Fortuyn and in 2004 filmmaker Theo van Gogh), the unfore‐
seen rejection of the European treaty in a referendum in 2005,
and the spectacular rise of various new parties. The most impor‐
tant of these are: the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), the Party for Free‐
dom (PVV) led by Geert Wilders and the Socialistische Partij (SP),
which was originally founded in 1972, but which made a rapid
progress after 2000, growing from 1.4% in 1994 to 16.6% in 2006.
Below is a table with their results in the national elections.
2002 2003 2006 2010 2012
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 17.0 5.7 – – –
Party for Freedom (PVV) – –  5.9 15.5 10.1
Socialist Party (SP) 5.9 6.3 16.6  9.8  9.6
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Both the LPF and the PVV managed to have a direct influ‐
ence on government policies. In 2002 the LPF was a partner in
a short‐lived coalition, while the PVV supported a minority
government in exchange for a say on government policy. One
of the main outcomes of this arrangement was the implemen‐
tation of more restrictive immigration and asylum policies.
This minority government stayed in power for 18 months, af‐
ter which Wilders decided to withdraw his support in protest
at the austerity measures being imposed on the Netherlands
by the European Union. Up to the present the SP has always
been an opposition party at the national level. However, at
the local and provincial levels the party is sometimes part of
governing alliances. In this chapter, I will portray and analyse
these three parties from the theoretical perspective of popu‐
lism. To begin with, the concept of populism will be discussed.
Populism: basic ingredients and “flavour” enhancers
Most scholars agree that populism arises from the perception
of current politics as an irreducible conflict between two ho‐
mogenous and antagonistic groups – a virtuous people vs. a
malicious elite – and on the aspiration to build a polity in
which the will of the virtuous people prevails1. The denuncia‐
tion of the elite as the incarnation of evil or at least as the
embodiment of corruption and incompetence, on the one
hand, and the glorification of the people as the embodiment
of all good virtues, true wisdom and authenticity, on the
other, may therefore be considered the basic hallmarks of
populism. This core feature of populism entails some other
1 D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell, Twenty‐first Century Populism: the Spec‐
tre of Western European Democracy, New York, 2008; P. Taggart, Popu‐
lism, Buckingham, 2000; C. Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist” in Govern‐
ment and Opposition, 39 (4), 2004, pp. 542‐563.
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closely connected features which reinforce and highlight the
core concept, or, to use a culinary metaphor, these other fea‐
tures are the “flavour enhancers” that enhance the taste of
the basic ingredient. In populism these flavour enhancers are:
an inclination towards conspiracy theories, a popular and
folksy style, a strong voluntarism and a preference for both
plebiscite‐based democracy and charismatic leadership2.
 The inclination to utilise conspiracy theories might be re‐
garded as a logical consequence of the aforementioned per‐
ception of the elite as both a homogeneous and corrupt
group. Indeed, the populist concept of elites is open and
vague enough to include all kinds of different elites – political,
cultural, media, academic and economic – thus giving the im‐
pression that they are all in cahoots with one other. Moreo‐
ver, this supposed coalition of elites is often accused of
knowingly favouring a clearly identified minority group that is
not part of the “real” nation. Whereas conspiracy theories like
this emphasise the anti‐elitism of populists, the use of a folksy
popular style serves the purpose of underscoring the populist
glorification of the people. By adopting simple and direct lan‐
guage, filled with anecdotes from every‐day life, straightfor‐
ward undecorated emotions and references to common wis‐
dom and popular culture, populists not only mark their dis‐
tance from the murky world of politics, they also express their
closeness to the common people.
Another feature used to highlight the anti‐elitist and, even
more so, the pro‐people element of populism is a strong vol‐
untaristic approach to politics. Populists have high expecta‐
tions of the power of politics based on the will and wisdom of
the people. To them the complexities and the compromises of
modern politics are not the logical consequence of the many
2 K. Vossen, “Populism in the Netherlands after Fortuyn”, in R. Verdonk
and G. Wilders, Compared Perspectives on European Politics and Society,
Volume 11, No. 1, April 2010.
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interests involved in the decision‐making process, and of con‐
stitutional and economic restraints. Rather, they are the result
of the incompetence and fecklessness of the elite, whose only
ambition is to maintain the status quo. Since populism aspires
to redesign democracy in order to let the people express and
impose their will without any limitations or impediments, the
introduction of various methods of direct democracy is also a
recurrent theme of its political approach. Not only do many
populists advocate the introduction of referenda, forms of re‐
call and direct elections for political office at the national
level, they also often attempt to present their own move‐
ments as the platform and mouthpiece of the “common peo‐
ple” by stressing their efforts to listen to their concerns. An‐
other recurrent theme is strong confidence in a charismatic
leader as the embodiment of the will of the people. The popu‐
list confidence in charismatic leadership is paradoxical since it
is grounded in the belief in a leader who is expected both to
lead and to embody the people, who in turn are portrayed as
being fed up with existing leaders. Populist leaders solve this
paradox by presenting the image of reluctant politicians,
blameless outsiders without any deeply‐felt need or aspira‐
tion to get involved in politics3.
 Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF)
The List Pim Fortuyn was founded by and named after Pim
Fortuyn, a sociologist who until 2001 was a relatively well‐
known columnist for a conservative magazine and the weekly
commentator in a television show4. In November 2001 For‐
3 Taggart, cit..
4 T. Akkermans, “Anti‐immigration parties and the defence of liberal val‐
ues: the exceptional case of the List Pim Fortuyn”, Journal of Political Ide‐
ologies, October 2005, 10 (3), pp. 337‐354; D. Pels, De geest van Pim. Het
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tuyn became the leading candidate for Liveable Netherlands,
a newly formed collection of local parties. However, already in
February 2002 he left the party as a result of an interview in
which he called Islam a “backward culture” and in which he
proposed to put an end to all Muslim immigration. With his
own hastily assembled party Fortuyn continued his – by Dutch
standards – startling campaign. Opinion polls showed his
growing popularity, which was based on a combination of anti‐
establishment sentiment and discontent with immigration and
multicultural society. As a result, some of his political oppo‐
nents placed Fortuyn in the same category as Jörg Haider of
Austria and Jean‐Marie Le Pen of France. However, it is diffi‐
cult to recognise genuine far‐right themes in the party plat‐
form or in Fortuyn’s books. Moreover, LPF included various
candidates of non‐Dutch origin in its lists (among others, a
Muslim woman and a black CapeVerdian businessman); it
even nominated a junior minister of Surinamese origin, who
was the first black junior minister in Dutch history. Also, two
days before his death, Fortuyn advocated a general pardon
for a large group of former asylum seekers in the Netherlands.
 On the 6th of May 2002 – nine days before the election –
Fortuyn was assassinated by an animal‐rights activist. His as‐
sassination notwithstanding, the elections went ahead as
scheduled and even without its leader LPF became the second
party with 17% of the votes: by far the best electoral debut
ever in the Netherlands. LPF was then invited to join a centre‐
right coalition with the Christian Democrats and the Liberals.
Without its leader, without a solid organisation and with a
group of members of parliament hastily lumped together, LPF
was destined to fail. After 87 days the coalition fell and in
January 2003 new elections were held, in which LPF lost most
of its votes (dropping from 17 to 5.7%). In the following years
gedachtegoed van een politieke dandy, Amsterdam, 2003; P. Lucardie and
G. Voerman, Populisten in de polder, Amsterdam, 2012, pp. 91‐136.
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LPF’s small parliamentary group was repeatedly plagued by
conflicts and the party organisation collapsed rapidly. In 2006,
various political heirs of Fortuyn participated in the national
elections, but none succeeded in winning a seat in parliament.
Because he was the first to break the electoral monopoly
of the established parties, Fortuyn is often considered as the
godfather of Dutch populism. Some of the main features of
populism, as discussed above, are indeed easily recognisable
in his pronouncements and political activity. To begin with,
since his days as a newspaper commentator in the 1990s, For‐
tuyn was already a fierce critic of the Dutch political elite. In
his opinion the Dutch elite had become an almost inaccessible
caste of professional politicians and apparatsjiks without any
real vision or aspiration, besides that of clinging to power. He
even introduced two nicknames to indicate the Dutch elite,
which both proved to be highly influential: “Our Kind of Peo‐
ple” (Ons Soort Mensen) and the “Church of the Left‐Wing”
(Linkse Kerk). Whereas the first nickname hinted at an alleged
tendency by the Dutch political and administrative elite to
share the spoils among “our kind of people” (e.g. by appoint‐
ing only members of the “right” parties to important offices),
the term “Church of the Left Wing” was meant to describe the
alleged monopoly on Dutch public opinion of the intelligentsia
of the left, who did not tolerate any criticism of their “sacred
cows”, such as the welfare state, multiculturalism, develop‐
ment aid and a progressive education.
 Obviously, this analysis of the behaviour of the elite comes
close to a conspiracy theory according to which the various
elites conspire among themselves to their own advantage.
Certainly many of Fortuyn’s followers have interpreted it in
this way, even attributing his assassination to deliberate
bashing of his figure by the Church of the Left‐Wing (“the
bullet came from the left”, as one of Fortuyn’s close friends
stated). However, to put his conspiracist anti‐elitism in some
perspective, Fortuyn himself had at the same time secretly
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concluded a strategic non‐aggression pact with the Christian‐
Democratic Party, the main party of the opposition and until
1994 the incarnation of Dutch political elites.
Still, we can affirm that anti‐elitism, enhanced by conspiracy
metaphors, is a clear feature in Fortuyn’s political outlook.
However, it is more difficult to find in his pronouncements the
other main ingredient of populism, i.e., a certain degree of glo‐
rification of the people as the embodiment of all good virtues.
More in accordance with a liberal view, he preferred to speak
of free, emancipated citizens pursuing their own interests. At
most one could argue that Fortuyn had a tendency to perceive
Dutch culture – or more broadly Western culture – as a homo‐
geneous entity, which must to be considered superior to all
others. Though perhaps, at the same time, we should admit
that the glorification of a homogeneous culture is hardly the
same thing as the glorification of a homogeneous people.
More importantly, Fortuyn’s opposition to existing elites
was not based so much on the conviction that the elite should
listen to and follow the will of a superior people, or even re‐
flect the will of the people; rather on his idea that elites are
supposed to lead and educate the people. As he elaborately
discussed in his most ambitious work, bombastically entitled
The Orphaned Society: a Religious‐Sociological Treatise (1995),
since the 1980s Dutch elites had failed to fulfil their role as
leaders and teachers, and as a result Dutch society had be‐
come “orphaned”. This problem of a lack of leadership became
more pressing as Fortuyn, inspired by Samuel Huntington’s
conception of the clash of civilizations, began to fear the ad‐
vance of Islamic culture within the weak “orphaned” Dutch
society. To overcome this threat the country was in need of a
new inspiring and caring elite: leaders who would serve as
role‐models guiding the nation with their vision, ambition and
pedagogical skills. Consequently, Fortuyn never advocated the
introduction of forms of plebiscitarian democracy, though he
asked for the direct election of some official positions to break
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the monopoly of the old elites. At the same time he did not
believe in democratically organised responsive political parties
as a means to satisfy the concerns of the people. In his view
parties were at most the instrument of the political leader, a
position he reinforced by creating his own electoral list named
after him and devoid of any organisational structure. Ulti‐
mately, in Fortuyn’s opinion, democratic politics should be a
struggle among unbounded, outspoken and daring political
leaders with the people as enthusiastic spectators. He repeat‐
edly expressed his contempt for “lack of class” of the Dutch
political elite, ridiculing for example the parliamentary speaker
because of her “vulgar” accent and the prime‐minister be‐
cause of his ordinary suits and his use of soccer‐metaphors.
Living in his Palazzo di Pietro with a butler and two lap‐dogs
(cocker‐spaniels), wearing highly expensive, dandy‐like outfits,
talking openly about his nightly adventures in gay‐bars and
publishing several rather pretentious books filled with socio‐
logical jargon, Fortuyn could hardly be described as a politi‐
cian who tried to imitate the common Dutch citizen. He viewed
charismatic leadership as a political necessity: “A competent
leader is father and mother at the same time. He is the law‐
maker and protector of the cohesion of the herd. The compe‐
tent leader is the biblical Good Shepherd. He defines values
and builds bridges. He is strict and merciful. He is inaccessible
and understanding. […] Let us prepare ourselves for his arri‐
val, so we can give him a warm welcome”5.
It is fairly safe to assume that Fortuyn perceived himself as
the embodiment of this new charismatic leader, making him,
in the opinion of many commentators, the prototype of the
narcissistic personality on the political stage.
The murder of Fortuyn – the first political assassination in
the Netherlands in 350 years – led to an unprecedented out‐
5 P. Fortuyn, De Verweesde Samenleving. Een religieus‐sociologisch tractaat,
1995.
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pouring of public emotion, with “seas of flowers” and sponta‐
neous shrines where thousands left messages, in which many
expressed a sense of personal affinity with the deceased6. In
the media many people stated, using almost the same words,
that “Fortuyn dared to say what I myself think”, with refer‐
ence mostly to Fortuyn’s criticism of multiculturalism and im‐
migration policies. For this reason Fortuyn became for many a
“people’s politician”, and consequently for others he was the
populist politician par excellence who exploited primitive
popular feelings (in the Netherlands distinctively called
“underbelly sentiments”). Nonetheless, both qualifications are
puzzling, since one can hardly find in Fortuyn a discernible
concern for the opinions of the common people, let alone an
urge to represent their will. Rather, he may better be viewed
as the advocate of a more elitist democracy: most of his
thoughts seem to be focused on how the elite should behave
and act in order to lead and guide the people. At the same
time one cannot entirely ignore the fact that both his follow‐
ers and many (if not most) of his opponents perceived Fortuyn
as a leader who had the ability to express popular feelings, or
at least to convince “the people” that he dared to speak aloud
what so many of them thought. Therefore, understanding For‐
tuyn’s populist dimension means, above all, focusing on the
charismatic component of his outlook; that is, on the specific
bond between followers and followed.
The Party for Freedom (PVV)
Since Fortuyn’s death and the disintegration of his party in the
following months, various new parties have attempted to step
6 P. J. Margry, “The Murder of Pim Fortuyn and Collective Emotions. Hype,
Hysteria and Holiness in The Netherlands?”, Etnofoor, no. 16, 2003, pp.
102‐127.
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into what was at the time perceived as a political vacuum,
using the same kind of language on Islam and its alleged
threat to Dutch liberties. By 2006 Geert Wilders and his Party
for Freedom (PVV) proved the most promising candidate for
filling that vacuum7. After the PVV had made a modest elec‐
toral debut in the 2006 national elections (5.9%), Wilders suc‐
ceeded in attracting an enormous amount of national, as well
as international, media attention by offering a whole range of
spectacular storylines and performances, such as the release
of his anti‐Muslim movie, Fitna (March 2008), and his deten‐
tion at Heathrow Airport, a consequence of the British Home
Secretary’s ban on him entering the country (February 2009).
In the 2010 national elections the PVV more than doubled its
support (15.5% of the votes) and the party became a serious
player in coalition formation.
The attempt to classify the PVV in ideological terms has
puzzled many observers both in the Netherlands and abroad.
Whereas before 2002 most commentators were often in‐
clined to classify a new party appearing on the political scene
as belonging to extreme right, there is now a remarkable re‐
luctance to use such a label for the PVV. Undoubtedly this re‐
luctance is a result of Pim Fortuyn’s assassination by a political
activist, which some considered a direct consequence of the
campaign of “Fortuyn bashing” conducted by left‐wing parties
and the press. Since the assassination of filmmaker Theo van
Gogh by a radical Islamist in November 2004 Geert Wilders is
living under permanent police protection. Looking at the party
platform and language, however, it is not difficult to discern
various characteristic features of populism. To begin with, we
see – as in the case of Fortuyn – much evidence of strong anti‐
elitism, mingled – in the case of Wilders – with an apocalyptic
7 M. Fennema, Geert Wilders. Tovenaarsleerling, Amsterdam, 2010; Lu‐
cardie and Voerman, Populisten in de polder, cit., pp. 151‐186; K. Vossen,
“Classifying Wilders: The ideological development of Geert Wilders and
his Party for Freedom”, Politics, vol. 31 (3), 2011, pp. 179‐189.
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conspiracy theory in which his two main enemies go hand in
hand: Islam and left‐wing politics. For Wilders, Islam is not a
religion but a totalitarian ideology, which after the demise of
communism and fascism poses the third great threat to West‐
ern modernity. Following Bat Ye’or’s infamous Eurabia theory
and Solomon and Al Mahdiqi’s Al Hijra‐theory, more than
once Wilders has denounced Muslim immigration as the inte‐
gral part of a deliberate strategy to Islamise Europe. This, it is
argued, was allowed by left‐wing political parties who hoped
to gain a new loyal constituency after the loss of their old
one.8 Referring to the Islamic precept of taqqia, which allows
Muslims living in non‐Muslim countries to hide their true be‐
liefs, Wilders repeatedly doubted the sincerity of Muslims ap‐
parently willing to assimilate in their host countries. To him
the only right approach is the complete marginalisation of
Muslims who, because of their reliance on taqqia, are by defi‐
nition untrustworthy. Examples of this “rejectionism” are his
request that the Koran be banned, his proposal for a “head
rag‐tax”, but also his infamous remark that millions of Euro‐
pean Muslims who do not adhere to Western values should
be expelled from Europe.
At the same time Wilders has identified “the elite” more
and more as a broad leftist coalition, in which almost all Dutch
parties and politicians, but also of large parts of the media,
the courts, the universities and the bureaucracy are involved.
In his view, leftist politics represent above all a mentality, a
post‐material, progressive and permissive attitude that has
spread out like an inkblot through Dutch elites since the 1960s
to become solidly rooted in all vested Dutch political parties.
Following a strategy of depoliticising political issues, subsidis‐
ing instruments that spread progressive opinions (such as the
8 B. Ye’or, Eurabia. The Euro‐Arab Axis, New York, 2005; S. Solomon and E.
Al Maqdisi, Modern day Trojan Horse: Al Hijra, the Islamic doctrine of mi‐
gration, Accepting Freedom or Imposing Islam, 2009; G. Wilders, Marked
for Death: Islam’s War against the West and Me, 2012.
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often criticised public broadcasting service) and tabooing and
demonising contrasting opinions, this progressive, politically
correct class managed to “hijack” Dutch democracy and gov‐
ernance. Though Wilders might also have been inspired by
American neo‐conservative theories (such as Irving Kristol’s
new class theory), the main inspiration for his elite‐criticism
seems to be Pim Fortuyn’s Church of the Left‐Wing metaphor,
which he elaborated and enhanced together with the Eurabia
Theory. As a result, Wilders has moved a few steps further
than Fortuyn with regard to Islam, as demonstrated by his
proposals to ban the Koran, to introduce a “head‐rag” tax and
to expel non‐integrated Muslims. One could argue that
Wilders considers Islam more dangerous to Western civiliza‐
tion than Fortuyn did and that therefore he advocates more
radical measures to protect democracy. Whereas his battle
against Islam initially seemed to be a personal crusade,
Wilders more and more began to refer to the common people
as his allies. “Henk and Ingrid”, as he has named them, are fed
up with Moroccan street gangs, headscarves and Islamisation
and ask for immediate action. To this end Wilders demands
more direct forms of democracy such as referenda and di‐
rectly elected mayors, police commissioner and even judges.
“Not the political elite, but the people should have the oppor‐
tunity to express more often their will, because together the
people know better than the left‐wing clique”.
From the perspective of populism, however, it is more dif‐
ficult to perceive Wilders as the archetypical populist politi‐
cian, rather than as the reluctant outsider. Operating in the
House of Parliament since the 1990s, Wilders might better be
characterised as a passionate professional politician who (as
he himself has often stated) “enjoys parliamentary politics”
and who knows all the ins and outs of parliamentary proce‐
dure, conventions and informal networks. Indeed he acted
quite effectively as a substitute for the parliamentary speaker.
The PVV parliamentary group, specially selected and thor‐
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oughly coached by Wilders, thus far gives the impression of
competence and professionalism, especially when compared
to the chaotic performance of most of the other new parties
in parliament. Because of this non‐populist feature, Wilders
managed to escape one of the pitfalls of populist parties:
rapid disintegration as the result of political amateurism.
Socialistische Partij (SP)
Whereas Fortuyn and Wilders are usually positioned (and po‐
sition themselves) on the right of the political spectrum, the
Socialistische Partij (SP) is usually positioned on the (far) left.
Nonetheless, in the Netherlands the SP could also be consid‐
ered a populist party, although of a left‐wing populist strand9.
Formed in 1972 by a group of Maoist dissidents who had bro‐
ken away from the Communist Party, the SP was for a long
time a small, tightly organised, energetic group of extremely
devoted members who, because of their door‐to‐door cam‐
paigning, were nicknamed the “Red Jehovah’s Witnesses”.
Most of the early SP activists were middle‐class students who
had dropped out of their universities to work in factories and
who identified strongly with working‐class interests, tastes
and life styles. Their campaigning in working‐class districts and
on factory floors and their attempts to imitate working‐class
culture were a result of their Maoist ideology and, more spe‐
cifically, of Mao’s so‐called mass‐line which stated: “Go to the
masses and learn from them, synthesise their experience into
better‐articulated principles and methods, then do propa‐
ganda work among the masses and call upon them to put
9 Lucardie and Voerman, cit., pp. 37‐70; L. March, “From Vanguard of the
Proletariat to Vox Populi: Left‐Populism as a Shadow of contemporary so‐
cialism”, SAIS‐Review, no. 1, 2007, pp. 63‐76.
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these principles and methods into practice so as to solve their
problems and help them achieve liberation and happiness”.
The “masses” however initially gave the SP a cold shoulder.
Despite all its efforts to reach and behave like the masses, the
party was probably still too much associated with spiritless
leftist theoretical disputes and 1970s student radicalism. In
the early 1990s, after five unsuccessful attempts to be elected
in the national parliament, the SP changed its course under
the leadership of Jan Marijnissen, who in his hometown Oss (a
small factory town in the south‐east of the country) had es‐
tablished a relatively popular and active branch. With the help
of a few congenial journalists and public relations managers,
Marijnissen attempted to establish an image of the SP as “a
party of doers” with a strong contempt for intellectual waf‐
fling and a penchant for direct action. At the same time the SP
positioned itself as the party of general protest against a po‐
litical system in which all other parties (including the Labour
Party and even the Green Party) had to some extent em‐
braced the anti‐state, neo‐liberal agenda. For this purpose the
SP adopted a new catchy slogan: “Vote Against: Vote SP” and
a splattered tomato as symbol. The new course paid off and
for the first time in 1994 the SP entered Parliament.
In the 1990s Marijnissen, as the party’s figurehead, suc‐
cessfully established himself as the only real outsider in a po‐
litical culture characterised by strong consensus, technocratic
belief in smart governance and decreasing political participa‐
tion. In a number of interviews, in parliamentary speeches and
in two books he published in the 1990s, Marijnissen painted a
picture of a rather homogeneous neo‐liberal money‐obsessed
political elite, made up of almost identical parties and politi‐
cians who had lost any connections with the concerns and
tastes of “the ordinary people”. Working in the House of Par‐
liament meant for Marijnissen (and for his only other parlia‐
mentary group member) a daily struggle against arrogant and
selfish people, who – in his opinion – spoke an incomprehen‐
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sible jargon and had devised all kinds of procedures and gim‐
micks to shut out outsiders. Besides these more general accu‐
sations of deliberate exclusion and discrimination, from time
to time Marijnissen imbued his anti‐elitism with some ele‐
ments of the old left‐wing conspiracy theory (hidden domi‐
nance of multinationals corporations, international bankers
and American military interests), but he also criticised profes‐
sional welfare workers and elitist left‐wing intellectuals who
attempted to impose their multicultural, cosmopolitan and
libertarian worldviews on the working‐class10.
In contrast with this “phoney left” who kept aloof from or‐
dinary people, Marijnissen still adhered to the old Maoist
mass‐line: it was the elite who had to listen and learn from
the people, not the other way around. In most of his public
statements of the 1990s Marijnissen referred in some way or
other to the ordinary people as the raison d’être of the SP. In
nearly all his interviews he stressed his background as a
welder in a metal factory and expressed his preference for the
honest, altruistic, sometimes raw company of his old working‐
class mates in his Brabant hometown. “By simple intuition”
many of these uneducated and despised people “knew right
from wrong and a wise from a false decision”. On the one
hand the party’s commitment to the cause of ordinary people
was stressed by the altruist and energetic mind‐set of SP
members, symbolised by the much‐publicised renunciation of
all political earnings in exchange for a working‐class salary. On
the other hand the SP stressed its direct communication with
ordinary people by establishing an emergency telephone
number and consulting hours, through which anyone could
ask for assistance or submit a complaint (often resulting in
parliamentary questions), and of course by the presence of
the party in all kinds of protest demonstrations.
10 J. Marijnissen, Tegenstemmen, een rood antwoord op Paars, 1996; J.
Marijnissen, Effe dimmen. Een rebel in Den Haag, 1998.
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Besides these efforts to present itself as the collector of
grievances and as the mouthpiece for the common people, the
SP also advocated the introduction of elements of direct de‐
mocracy within the political system as a whole, such as refer‐
enda, forms of recall and direct election to political office at
the national level. However, these initiatives of institutional re‐
form have been eclipsed by the party’s emphasis on its role as
a channel of communication with the ordinary people. From an
organisational point of view the SP was a tightly organised, al‐
most old‐fashioned mass‐party with over 50,000 members – in
sharp contrast with the loosely organised movement of For‐
tuyn, not to mention the one‐member party of Wilders.
In 1999, after five years of successful opposition, the SP
changed again its strategy and course, adopting a new pro‐
gram and a new campaign strategy. To symbolise the change
of course and strategy, the SP chose a new more proactive
slogan: “Vote for, vote SP”, instead of the previous “Vote
against, vote SP”. Of course, by emphasising its eagerness to
“really change things”, the party implied that it intended to
pay more attention to the framing and elaboration of a solid
and detailed platform, while at the same time dropping old
dogmas which stood in the way of cooperation with other
parties, such as opposition to the monarchy and to NATO and
its advocacy of nationalisations. At the local level the SP had
already taken up governing responsibility, showing its ability
and willingness to compromise whenever necessary. Its para‐
digmatic model has now become the old and still respected
Dutch Labour Party and its march to power in the 1920s and
1930s. Behind its new proactive slogans the SP had now con‐
verted to a more incremental approach to politics11.
Of course, its emphasis on regierungsfähigkeit and its new
attitude as a party of government implied for the SP partially
shedding its image as the party of protest and the direct
11 P. Lucardie and G. Voerman, cit., pp. 37‐70.
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mouthpiece of the “ordinary people”. Though we can still find
some expressions of anti‐elitism and glorification of the peo‐
ple, it is not difficult to discern a marked change in tone and
style in Marijnissen’s speeches. Instead of criticising “the
whole lot” with the usual blunt words, he now clearly finds a
difference between “the good, the bad and the ugly”, disap‐
proving at the same time of Wilders’ totally negative attitude.
Politics is above all getting things done for the people, even
when it means making compromises and cooperating with
former enemies. One can also discern a less folksy and more
thoughtful intellectual tone in Marijnissen’s repeated appeals
for a cultural and moral regeneration which in his view is nec‐
essary to counter the shallow hedonism and dulling of the
population. In terms of electoral growth, the change of strat‐
egy and course proved highly successful: within twelve years
the SP grew from 1.32% to 16.6% of the popular vote. How‐
ever, shortly after the victory of 2006, the limits of this new
course also became clear: despite its emphasis on a positive
governing attitude, the SP was not prepared to make the
compromises necessary to participate in a new government.
Having also lost its role as the most vocal anti‐system party to
Wilders and his PVV, the SP found itself struggling to find a
new role as a government opposition party. Tensions within
the party increased as a result of Marijnissen’s resignation
from the leadership in 2009. His successor, Agnes Kant,
proved a failure and after only a year was succeeded by Emil
Roemer. This primary‐school teacher was able to strike the
same chords as Marijnissen, although Roemer apparently was
more eager to enter government. During 2011 and in the
early months of 2012 the SP was very successful in opinion
polls and seemed to be heading for a place in the government
coalition. However, in the ensuing electoral campaign the La‐
bour Party, lead by Diederik Samsom, made an unexpected
come‐back at the expense of the SP, which again was ex‐
cluded from government formation.
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Different flavours of populism
Because of the disappointing results of both SP and PVV, the
2012 national elections have been interpreted by some com‐
mentators as the demise of Dutch populism. There are indeed
enough good reasons to use the populist label for both the
PVV and the SP, as well as for the LPF. At the same time, the
label does not fully cover the different ideologies and styles of
these parties. Since populism is a “thin” ideology, it is gener‐
ally found in combination with another ideology12.. Within the
SP the ideological partner is a specific version of socialism; in
the PVV it’s a mixture of nationalism and strong Islamophobia;
in Pim Fortuyn’s list it’s a cocktail of populist, liberal and elitist
ingredients. As a common denominator, populism may there‐
fore be misleading. Whether Dutch populism has actually be‐
gun to decline is far from certain. At the beginning of 2013,
both PVV and SP were again on the rise in the surveys.
Though it is unlikely that in the near future either party will
become the most powerful political party of the Netherlands,
their game is certainly not over.
12 B. Stanley, “The thin ideology of populism”, Journal of political ideolo‐
gies, 13(1), 2008, pp. 95‐110.
